
Lecture 12: Certificates


CS 181S

Spring 2024

SSL/TLS Handshake



SSL/TLS Handshake



Certificates

- **Digital certificate** is a document binding together:
 - identity of principal
 - **public key** of that principal (might be encryption or verification key)
- binding together = signed
- Notation: Cert(S; I) is a certificate issued by principal I for principal S
 - Cert(S; I) = (id_s, K_S, Sign(id_s, K_S; k_I))
 - Issuer I is certifying that K_S belongs to subject id_S
- Fingerprint: H(Cert(S; I))

Public-key infrastructure (PKI)

- System for managing distribution of certificates
- Two main philosophies:
 - **Decentralized:** anarchy, no leaders
 - Centralized: oligarchy, leadership by a few elite

PKI Example 1: PGP

- Uses a decentralized PKI philosophy
- "Pretty Good Privacy" [Zimmerman 1991]
 - toolset for PKI, encryption, signing of files and emails
 - OpenPGP is implemented by GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)
- Users manage a keyring:
 - Alice has her own key in her keyring
 - When Alice meets up with Bob at a key-signing party...



PKI Example 2: CAs

- Uses a centralized PKI philosophy (at least as evolved in marketplace)
- Invented (?) by Digital [Gasser et al. 1989], used in early Netscape browsers
- Certificate authority (CA): principal whose purpose is to issue certificates

X.509 certificates

[<u>RFC 5280]</u>

Contents of certificate:

- subject distinguished name
- subject public key (and the algorithm)
- issuer distinguished name
- serial number (unique within certs issued by this issuer)
- validity interval (start and end time)
- extensions...
- issuer's signature on the above (and the name of the algorithm)

Finding a useful certificate

Certificate chain: sequence of certificates that certify each other

- on one end, a certificate for the principal you want to authenticate
- on the other end, a certificate for a principal you already know: the *root* of trust
- you must trust every issuer in the chain to issue certificates

A constraint extension

• "Basic constraint": two values:

- a Boolean: is this key permitted to be used to verify other certificates? i.e., can it be an issuer's key?
 - At best redundant w.r.t key usage extension, which itself is more precise
- an integer: number of intermediate certificates permitted to follow this one in a chain
- ought to be marked critical

Using a CA

- Your system comes pre-installed with CA's self-signed certificate Cert(CA; CA)
- When you receive a message signed by Alice:
 - you contact CA to get Cert(Alice; CA)
 - or Alice just includes that certificate with her message

Exercise 1: Using A CA

- In your web browser, visit a website you frequently use over https
- Inspect the TLS certificate for that web server:
 - 1) How many certificates are in the certificate chain?
 - 2) Who is the root CA for that certificate chain?

CAs and web browsers

- Web server has certificate Cert(server; CA) installed
 - Server's identity is its URL
 - CA is a root for which Cert(CA; CA) is installed in browser
- Browser authenticates web server
 - Using server's URL and public key from certificate

Many CAs

- There can't be only one
 - No single CA is going to be trusted by all the world's governments, militaries, businesses
 - Though within an organization such trust might be possible

So there are many

- Around 1500 observed on public internet
- Your OS and/or browser comes with some pre-installed
- Organizations act as their own CA, e.g....
 - Company issues certificates to employees for VPN
 - Bank issues certificates to customers
 - Central bank issues certificates to other banks
 - Manufacturer issues certificates to sensing devices

Exercise 2: Root CAs

- How many root CA certificates are installed on your computer for your preferred browser?
- Is the root CA you identified in Exercise 1 on that list?

Enrollment with a CA

- You create a key pair: you do this so that CA doesn't learn your private key
- You generate a certificate signing request (CSR); it contains the identity you are claiming
- You send the CSR to a CA, perhaps along with payment
- The CA verifies your identity (maybe)
- The CA signs your key, thus creating a certificate, and sends certificate to you

Issuing certificates

Conflicting goals:

- CA private signing key must be kept
 - the public verification key is pre-installed on user systems; hard to update
 - if ever leaked, signing key could be used to forge certificates
 - easy way to realize goal: keep it in cold storage
- CA private signing key must be available for use
 - to sign new certificates when users request them
 - easy way to realize goal: keep it in computer's memory

Issuing certificates

Solution: use root and intermediate CAs

- root CA: the certificate at root of trust in a chain; preinstalled; key kept in highly secure storage
- intermediate CA(s): certified by root CA, themselves certify user keys; might be run by a different organization than root

PROBLEMS WITH PKI

Problem 1: Revocation

- Keys (subject's, issuer's) get compromised
- Or subject leaves an organization

...certificates therefore need to be revoked

There's no perfect solution

- Fast expiration
- Certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
- Online certificate validation

Fast expiration

- Idea:
 - Validity internal is short, e.g. 10 min to 24 hr
 - A kind of revocation thus happens automatically
 - Any compromise is bounded

Problem:

- CAs have to issues new certificates frequently, including checking identities
- Machines have to update certificates frequently

Certificate revocation lists (CRLs)

- Idea:
 - CA posts list of revoked certificates
 - Clients download and check every time they need to validate certificate

• Problems:

- Clients don't (because usability)
- Or they cache, leading to TOCTOU attack
- CRL must always be available (so an attractive DoS target)
- Chromium <u>does this</u>, with a CRL limited to 250kb

Online certificate validation

- Idea:
 - CA runs validation server
 - Clients contact it each time to validate certificate

Problems:

- Clients don't
- Server must always be available (so an attractive DoS target)
- Reveals to CA which websites you want to access

Online certificate validation

Follow-on solution: stapling

- Certificates must be accompanied by fresh assertion from CA that certificate is still valid
- Whoever presents certificate to client is responsible for acquiring assertion
- Firefox <u>does this</u> but doesn't *hard fail* because "[validation servers] aren't yet reliable enough"
 - Unless web site has previously served up a certificate to browser with Must Staple extension set

Problem 2: Authority

- CAs go rogue, get hacked, issue certificates that they should never have issued
 - e.g., Dutch CA DigiNotar (2011), which was included in many root sets: 500 bogus certificates issued, including for Google, Yahoo, Tor
- Missing a means for authorization of who may issue certificates for which principals

Authority

There's no perfect solution

- Key pinning: upon first connection to a server, client learns a set of public keys for server; in future connections, cortificate must contain one of these keys
- Certificate transparency: maintain a public log of issued certificates; require any presented certificate to be in that log; monitor log to notice misbehavior
- Certificate Authority Authorization (CAA): piggyback on DNS system; DNS record for entity specifies allowed CAs; a good CA won't issue cert unless they are authorized
- DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE): piggyback like CAA; client checks whether cert comes from authorized CA