

Lecture 9: Use and Abuse of the Stack (cont'd)

CS 105


February 20, 2019

Memory Referencing Bug Example

```
typedef struct {
    int a[2];
    double d;
} struct_t;
```

```
fun(0) → 3.14
fun(1) → 3.14
fun(2) → 3.140001
fun(3) → -2.000001
fun(4) → 3.14
Segmentation fault
```

Explanation:



Review: Buffer Overflow Stack

| Stack Frame for call_echo | | | | |
|------------------------------|----|----|----|---------------|
| 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | saved %rip |
| 00 | 40 | 06 | 34 | |
| 00 | 32 | 31 | 30 | buf ← %rsp |
| 39 | 38 | 37 | 36 | |
| 35 | 34 | 33 | 32 | |
| 31 | 30 | 39 | 38 | |
| 37 | 36 | 35 | 34 | |
| 33 | 32 | 31 | 30 | |

```

/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}


```

```

echo:
    subq $18, %rsp
    movq %rsp, %rdi
    call gets
    call puts
    addq $18, %rsp
    ret

```

Review: Stack Canaries



```

/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}

```

```

echo:
    subq    $24, %rsp
    movq   %rsp, %rdi
    call   gets
    call   puts
    movq   24(%rsp), %rdx
    xorq   %fs:40, %rdx
    je     .L3
    call   __stack_chk_fail
.L3:
    addq   $24, %rsp
    ret

```

Review: Memory Tagging




Code Reuse Attacks

- Key idea: execute instructions that already exist
- Defeats memory tagging defenses
- Examples:
 1. return to a function in the current program
 2. return to a library function (e.g., return-into-libc)
 3. return to some other instruction (return-oriented programming)

Returning to a function

0x7FFFFFFF

- Overwrite the saved return address with the location of a function in the current program




Handling Arguments

what function expects
when it is called...

0x7FFFFFFF


rdi = "/bin/sh"



overflow with argument

0x7FFFFFFF

rdi = arg1



Return-into-libc

| Sr.No. | Function & Description |
|--------|--|
| 1 | double atof(const char *str) ↗ Converts the string pointed to, by the argument <i>str</i> to a floating-point number (type double). |
| 2 | int atoi(const char *str) ↗ Converts the string pointed to, by the argument <i>str</i> to an integer (type int). |
| 3 | long int atol(const char *str) ↗ Converts the string pointed to, by the argument <i>str</i> to a long integer (type long int). |
| 8 | void free(void *ptr) ↗ Deallocates the memory previously allocated by a call to <i>calloc</i> , <i>malloc</i> , or <i>realloc</i> . |
| 9 | void *malloc(size_t size) ↗ Allocates the requested memory and returns a pointer to it. |
| 10 | void *realloc(void *ptr, size_t size) ↗ Attempts to resize the memory block pointed to by <i>ptr</i> that was previously allocated with a call to <i>malloc</i> or <i>calloc</i> . |
| 15 | int system(const char *string) ↗ The command specified by <i>string</i> is passed to the host environment to be executed by the command processor. |
| 16 | void *bsearch(const void *key, const void *base, size_t nitems, size_t size, int (*compar)(const void *, const void *)) ↗ Performs a binary search. |
| 17 | void qsort(void *base, size_t nitems, size_t size, int (*compar)(const void *, const void*)) ↗ Sorts an array. |
| 18 | int abs(int x) ↗ Returns the absolute value of <i>x</i> . |
| 22 | int rand(void) ↗ Returns a pseudo-random number in the range of 0 to <i>RAND_MAX</i> . |
| 23 | void srand(unsigned int seed) ↗ This function seeds the random number generator used by the function rand . |

Properties of x86-64

- variable length instructions
- not word aligned
- dense instruction set

Return Oriented Programming

```
f7 c7 07 00 00 00  
0f 95 45 c3
```

```
test $0x00000007, %edi  
setnzb -61 (%ebp)
```

```
c7 07 00 00 00 0f  
95  
45  
c3
```

```
movl $0xf0000000, (%edi)  
xchg %ebp, %eax  
inc %ebp  
ret
```

Gadgets


```
void setval(unsigned *p) {  
    *p = 3347663060u;  
}
```

```
<setval>:  
4004d9: c7 07 d4 48 89 c7 movl $0xc78948d4, (%rdi)  
4004df: c3                ret
```


gadget address: 0x4004dc
encodes: movq %rax, %rdi; ret
executes: %rdi <- %rax

Example Gadgets


Load Constant



Load from memory



Return-oriented programming attack




- Final ret in each gadget will start next one

Return Oriented Programming

Return-Oriented
Programming

is a lot like a ransom
note, BUT instead of cutting
out letters from magazines,
YOU ARE cutting out
instructions from text
segments

Return-Oriented Shellcode



Address Space Layout Randomization



The state of the world

Defenses:

- high-level languages
- Stack Canaries
- Memory tagging
- ASLR
- continuing research and development...

But all they aren't perfect!

